MARKET SOCIETY’S MORAL SUBJECTS: INTEREST, SENTIMENT, PROPERTY by Austin-Broos, Diane
 Yearbook of the Centre for Cosmopolitan Studies 2014(1) 1 
 
 
 
MARKET SOCIETY’S MORAL SUBJECTS: 
INTEREST, SENTIMENT, PROPERTY 
Plenary Address 
ASA Conference ‘Anthropology and the Enlightenment’ 
Edinburgh, June 2014 
Diane Austin-Broosi 
 
 
When we think of the morality of markets, we 
think first of Wall Street banks and their reckless 
misdeeds … But the moral and political challenge 
we face today is more pervasive and more 
mundane – to rethink the role and reach of 
markets in our social practices, human 
relationships and everyday lives.  
Michael Sandel 2012 
 
 
y comments address two well-known texts. One is 
Crawford Macpherson’s portrait of ‘possessive 
individualism’ in which he suggests that ruthless competition for 
power through possessions is the distinctive feature of a market 
society which first took shape in seventeenth century England. 
The other is Adam Smith’s account of moral sentiment which 
revolves around a creative tension between human sympathy and 
‘betterment’ or ‘self love.’ In Smith’s view, betterment is the 
motive force for economic growth and consequently human 
‘improvement.’ Therefore he did not accept that this betterment 
was merely selfishness or self-interest. Macpherson wrote from 
the vantage point of labour movements and class conflict in the 
first half of the twentieth century; Smith from the later eighteenth 
century, promoting commerce and a Humean ethics.ii In the 
course of their particular projects, each writer fashioned an image 
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of the person that inhabits market society. The texts are 
suggestive and also point to a further theme: divergent views of 
property, its origin myth in the West, and its bearing on social-
moral life. iii 
Three factors provide some context. The first involves 
ethnography. A raft of writing on a new and dangerous exotic, 
financial traders and their products, still says very little about the 
majority of market participants – mundane income earners and 
consumers. The market’s moral subjects are not all Wall Street 
Wolves. More generally, neoliberalism and its agents and 
institutions are a particular social order and a crucial one to 
critique.iv Nonetheless this focus can divert attention from the fact 
that, although we are all in capitalism now, we vary as market 
participants. Second, an earlier anthropology embodied in the 
work of Louis Dumont and Marshall Sahlins anticipated these 
concerns with their accounts of ‘western’ social science and its 
taken-for-granted logics of individualism and utilitarianism. 
Important in their time, these critiques should be refined in view 
of the fact that now most ethnography concerns groups engaged 
with capitalism. The latter is no longer anthropology’s ‘other’ but 
rather a central concern.v Third, my reflections on the post-
settlement history of indigenous central Australians have created 
an interest in the very different regimes of value produced in 
systems where moveable property is dominant on the one hand, 
or peripheral on the other. In a way that Dumont and Sahlins 
would approve of, elements of indigenous experience present an 
inverted image of market society. Yet they also reside in this 
milieu with a history constrained by its power.  
In sum, my interest in the person, property, Macpherson 
and Smith is the beginnings of a project concerned with 
capitalism and its moral subjects. Below I argue that property 
rather than selfishness-or-sympathy can provide a more fruitful 
focus for this project. With regard to property’s ubiquity, I 
instance the enduring difference of indigenous Australians. 
Factors that revolve around property go to the heart of their 
position today. vi 
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C.B. Macpherson 
Macpherson describes the tenets of possessive individualism in 
this way: ‘…man is free and human by virtue of his sole 
proprietorship of his person.’ This proprietorship makes him free 
to ‘alienate’ his labour; that is, to extend this ownership of self 
through the competitive pursuit of material possessions. Though 
men everywhere can seek power over each other, freedom is 
identified in fact ‘with domination over things.’vii Society is 
comprised of relations between these more and less powerful 
proprietors making it ‘essentially a series of market relations.’ 
Political society emerges as ‘a contractual device for the 
protection [and] regulation’ of relations between proprietors.viii 
In sum, Macpherson argues that the ethos, ideology or mindset 
that he terms ‘possessive individualism’ is the hallmark of a 
market society. Moreover, in this society a free man is essentially 
an owner or ‘proprietor’ while political society or the state has the 
protection of property as its central role.  
Dating this society from the seventeenth century, 
Macpherson argues that just this sociality was the source of 
Thomas Hobbes’s view of the ‘natural condition of man’ which he 
famously described as ‘nasty, brutish, and short’ when it lacked 
government. Central to Macpherson’s view is his understanding 
that possessive individualism proceeds from a notion of human 
freedom that inheres in sovereign selves, their individual labour, 
and the property acquired thereby. In short, only when the self 
and its most fundamental attributes are alienable and 
commodified as property can there be the war of all against all 
indicative both of the society Hobbes observed around him, and 
the imaginary state of nature which he based on these 
observations. Macpherson writes, ‘only in a society in which each 
man’s capacity to labour is … a market commodity, could all 
individuals be in this continual competitive power relationship.’  
From Macpherson’s point of view, thus it was in Hobbes’s time, 
and today. ix 
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He argues that this ideology of possessive individualism was in 
fact the beginnings of liberalism, the history of which he traces 
from Hobbes, through the Levellers of Cromwell’s time, to James 
Harrington and John Locke. In doing so, Macpherson wrote not 
simply a history of ideas but also a history of the state and society 
in market terms – a reading that critics suggest over-economized 
both periods and texts. James Tully provides an excellent 
summary of relevant literature. Inter alia, Tully argues that 
Macpherson used abstracted categories of freedom, power and 
proprietorship to encompass both the seventeenth century 
concerns of Hobbes and Locke with absolutism and government, 
and the eighteenth and nineteenth century concerns of Smith and 
other political economists with commerce and capitalism – 
thereby collapsing into one two distinct historical and intellectual 
moments. Tully observes, nonetheless, that Macpherson’s thesis 
of possessive individualism is comparable to Weber’s thesis of the 
Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism – univalent and 
historically inaccurate but suggestive for society today. x  
Frank Cunningham, a political philosopher, recently 
remarked that in the wake of a Thatcher/Reagan legacy able to 
survive the GFC, ‘possessive individualism confronts one at every 
turn.’ Certainly, the excess of finance capitalism today, neoliberal 
assaults on taxation and government, growing inequality in 
capitalist democracies, and the widespread pursuit of individual 
accumulation, all suggest aspects of possessive individualism. 
Strikingly, Louis Dumont used Macpherson’s account to 
characterise a society in which individualism rather than 
hierarchy is the encompassing value. More recently, in 
Melanesian ethnography, the possessive individual has been 
treated as a sign of capitalism’s onset, though not without 
ambivalence and some different ideas on the matter. As Martha 
Macintyre suggests, individualism can inhere in a person’s 
‘personal and autonomous’ reflections without entailing the 
possessive individual that Macpherson writes about. Indeed, later 
in his book Macpherson confined his portrait of this ideology, as a 
tool for legitimating capital, to a particular class. xi 
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Adam Smith 
Written across the second half of the eighteenth century, Adam 
Smith’s work is an ample source for human social attributes that 
Macpherson overlooks. In Albert Hirschman’s terms, their views 
are two among a significant range of ‘rival interpretations of 
market society’ aired between the seventeenth and twentieth 
centuries.xii The following remarks on Smith are organised 
around two themes: first, his view contra Rousseau, that human 
‘betterment’ is a constructive force; and second, his argument 
against Mandeville and Hobbes that the self-love (or interest) 
involved in betterment can be constructively tempered.  
In his lectures on jurisprudence, Smith declared ‘Food 
cloaths and lodging are all the wants of any animal whatever, and 
… are sufficiently provided for by nature. … Such is the delicacy 
of man alone, that no object is produced to his liking. He finds 
that in everything there is need for improvement.’ This statement 
ushered in Smith’s thinking on stadial economic growth, from 
savagery and hunting through pastoralism, to agriculture and 
finally, commerce. In the process, divisions of labour emerge, 
goods proliferate and diversify, money capital is created and 
property accumulates. Property and capital share their source 
with man’s desire for ‘humble’ things: 
 
…the principle which prompts to save is the desire of 
bettering our condition, a desire which … comes with us 
from the womb, and never leaves us till we go into the 
grave. …there is scarce perhaps a single instant in which 
any man [does not desire] improvement…  
 
This natural motivation of human beings (and especially males) 
arises from the desire to protect one’s intimates and thereby seek 
co-operation with others. In the process, a shared social and 
material environment is both changed and elaborated in a process 
that involves economy as a central part. xiii 
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In deist style, Smith suggests that, being natural, 
betterment is part of God’s design. On this point, his view is close 
to Locke’s not least because Locke and Smith shared a labour 
theory of value and thereby of property. Stephen Buckle 
illuminates that part of Locke’s philosophy with which Adam 
Smith concurred: 
 
Property arises … directly through the labour of 
individuals. … Labour is the means whereby property is 
acquired, both because of the role human beings play in 
God’s larger purposes for the whole created order, and 
because labour is the improving, value-adding activity 
required by the duty to preserve oneself and others. These 
two aspects are neatly conjoined if labour is thought of as a 
workmanship ….xiv  
 
Smith endorsed commercial life as the pursuit of betterment with 
its capacity, in turn, to bring prosperity and peace - in contrast to 
war-prone mercantile states. This optimism rested in part on a 
view of nature anchored by a distant but beneficent God. At the 
same time Smith embraced David Hume’s idea that morality has 
its fundamental origins in a process of ‘sympathetic interaction.’xv 
The moral sentiment of sympathy, grounded neither in abstracted 
reason nor a Christian conscience but rather in humankind’s 
sociality, constrains the self-interest involved in both individual 
betterment and society’s material improvement. These latter ideas 
defined the position from which Smith would counter the negative 
portrayals of self-interest provided by Mandeville and Hobbes.  
In his Theory of Moral Sentiment Smith begins with a remark 
on sympathy: ‘How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are 
evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the 
fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him 
though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing 
it.’ In Smith’s view this sympathy is grounded in man’s need 
socially to constitute the self. One learns ‘to accommodate and 
assimilate, as much as one can, our own sentiments, principles and 
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feelings, to those which we see … rooted in the persons whom we 
are obliged to live and converse a great deal with.’ xvi This process 
cultivates a sense of propriety and requires imagination; ie. human 
beings’ ability to conjure in their minds the circumstance of 
others.xvii From this intersubjectivity comes Stoic ‘self-command’ 
and prudence; the capacity to look ahead and temper desires in the 
here and now. The ensuing stability and surety brings beneficence 
in human affairs. Smith’s observations ultimately rest on the 
sociality of humankind wherein a reflective awareness of the 
utility as much as the amenability of anticipation and co-operation 
among those close at hand is the very basis of an ordered life.xviii  
In sum, self-interest is integral to betterment which, endorsed by 
God, is the natural bent of man. Yet betterment requires moral 
sympathy which, in its very sociality, constrains self-interest.  
Below, I remark on the relation between Smith’s moral 
thought and political economy. For the moment, it is fair to note 
that his notion of sympathy has limits which stem from his 
tempered engagement with the Stoics. From them Smith took the 
view that the ‘habitual sympathy’ of close association fosters 
‘affection.’ Stoicism also taught that the extirpation of desire 
allows one to extend this ‘circle’ of sympathy to those far afield. 
Smith’s empiricism made him sceptical of this proposal. 
Consequently he fell back on divine providence to encompass 
those with whom he felt, realistically, it would be hard to 
maintain sympathy. These included the indigent whom, 
Fleischaker argues, Smith sought to humanize in various ways, 
but nonetheless left to God’s grace. In this light Smith’s 
statement, ‘We despise a beggar,’ reports a social fact but also 
implies that the fact precludes sustained sympathy. Similarly, in 
his discussion of other ‘nations’ and ‘the savage,’ he draws the line 
at Stoic cosmopolitanism. 
 
The administration of the great system of the universe, 
however, the care of the universal happiness of all rational 
and sensible beings, is the business of God… To man is 
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allotted a much humbler department … the care of his own 
happiness, of that of his family, his friends, his country…xix 
 
Smith’s statements suggest that in the larger world of commerce, 
sympathy has limits. The indigent and savages are left to 
providence while self-love and betterment become the province of 
more socialized beings. When Smith bridled at Stoicism’s more 
ambitious aims he reflected, inadvertently perhaps, ideas that 
Weber would later term a ‘theodicy of good fortune.’xx 
  
Divergence, Convergence and Property 
The most obvious difference between Smith and Macpherson is 
that two key concepts, betterment and proprietorship, signal 
respectively positive and negative views of private and personal 
property. On the one hand, Smith made the liberal link between 
freedom, property and governance. Government would be a 
constructive force when it protected property. On the other hand, 
Macpherson saw property as the source of inequality, the tool of 
domination, and thereby as the principal cause of human 
limitation. Both were intensely interested in property and yet 
naturalized its presence. My suggestion is that each writer’s 
efforts were turned in a slightly different direction towards the 
defence or critique of liberalism; the one was an advocate for 
commerce and the market, the other a critic of inequality and the 
domination of one class by another.  
Macpherson’s aim was to link a primal scene of conflict with 
a recent class one. Hence his evocation of a war of all against all 
rendered as the attribute of market society over centuries. His 
method was to note commonalities across vast periods in order to 
build an abstracted model. In his account labour, it seems, was 
born both commodified and alienated. Neither stadial economic 
growth nor the transitions between feudalism, the mercantile 
state and capitalism have much part in his account. Consequently, 
his implicit portrait of capitalism’s person is a ‘stripped down’ 
market individual, either with property or without it. xxi Reading 
through Smith’s work, including his students’ notes on 
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jurisprudence, one must remark on his intellectual richness and 
the extraordinary empiricism that separated him even from 
Hume. Nonetheless, he struggled unsuccessfully to marry his 
empirical accounts of moral sentiment, context-specific and 
potentially variable, with general principles of justice and 
commerce. The final work on justice was never written and 
Wealth of Nations makes scant reference either to jurisprudence or 
morality. xxii Moreover, where political economy is concerned, 
Smith’s labour theory of value fell short of the further 
explorations produced by ‘modes of production’ analysis. His 
account of improvement, focussed on the division of labour and 
the proliferation of goods, remained disturbingly sanguine. The 
weight he gave to market equilibrium obscured the possibility of 
oligopoly, alienation, accumulation and domination. Hence the 
reader of Wealth of Nations can find an individual interpreted 
principally in terms of a system that both reflects and fuels self-
interest as well as the relentless growth of trade that will overrun 
the savage. xxiii  
Despite their respective insights, both Macpherson and 
Smith produce markedly abstracted accounts of the individual. 
Property or the impetus to it remains a perennial presence 
uncontextualized by history. Indeed, both their accounts suggest 
a further philosophical influence, the natural law of property. This 
distinctly European idea proposed that property inheres in the 
self or suum. Its origins are often attributed to Grotius, author of a 
tract ‘on the laws of war and peace’ published in 1625.xxiv John 
Locke provides a more familiar formulation: 
 
Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all 
men, yet every man has a property in his own person; this 
nobody has any right to but himself. The labour of his body 
and the work of his hands …are properly his. Whatsoever 
then he removes out of … nature …he hath mixed his 
labour with … and thereby makes it his property…xxv 
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But what idea and experience of property did this view involve? 
Critics note that Macpherson turns an essentially juristic idea of 
property as an individual right, counterpoised to an absolutist 
state, into a much more recent notion of economic man. In the 
hands of Grotius and Hobbes, property within the self concerned 
the matter of self-preservation or self-defence rather than self-
commodification. Even Locke’s ‘property’ involved civil and 
religious rights as much as goods. Property rights were rights 
over things but also over practices - provided they brought no 
harm. Eighteenth century republicanism, not least in North 
America, introduced a new juristic turn when citizens demanded 
freedom from or ‘non-domination’ by the state.xxvi  
This jural notion of property shifted markedly with the rise 
of moveable, non-landed property and monied interests. The 
latter were the principal concern of commercial society, and Adam 
Smith. Moreover, the capacities of human beings became 
deployable abilities and skills subject to divisions of labour, 
specialization (and alienation) allowing a vast diversity of goods 
and wealth accumulation. Smith wrote not of a right to personal 
preservation but rather of betterment through economic growth. 
This was the newly defined perspective of political economy. 
Moreover, just as Smith proposed that among all animals, man 
alone pursues improvement, Marx would note that ‘men 
distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to 
produce ... a definite mode of life.’ xxvii There is a crucial difference 
though. For Smith, a person came ‘from the womb’ with the desire 
for betterment whereas, for Marx, humankind’s reflective and 
tool-wielding response to nature, rather than an instinctual one, 
brought labour, the production of property and the 
transformation of human need. Humankind became the history-
making species-being.  
The transition from an origin myth embodied in the natural 
law of property to a history of property relations is also the 
transition from the domain of moral and political philosophy to 
the domain of political economy. Adam Smith wrote as this 
transition began while C.B. Macpherson’s work post-dates it. 
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Macpherson wrote as a political philosopher and Smith, as a 
philosopher in part. Both remained at a distance from an historical 
account of property and, as a consequence, failed to historicize 
market society adequately, or its changing and variable 
individuals. 
My suggestion is that market society today conforms more 
to Polanyi’s account than Macpherson’s. Social disembedding 
throws up new extra-local institutions that make of capitalism a 
much more forbidding order than before. xxviii Concurrently, local 
milieux are increasingly de-personalized making private and 
personal property more important. Daniel Miller has described 
part of this process in terms of mass consumption and individual 
investment in housing and possessions. A burgeoning material 
culture, he suggests, brings more choice for individuals. Miller’s 
focus is the ways in which property is used both to objectify 
persons and elicit new desires. He sets aside the adverse effects of 
growth economies on social life and the natural environment. 
Notwithstanding, most of us engage in the process Miller 
describes albeit variously and in different degrees. We create 
micro-environments for ourselves in which material things begin 
to stand proxy for more nuanced socialities. Both Simmel and 
Veblen noticed.xxix 
Save for a significant minority, the moral subjects involved 
in this process are not Macpherson’s possessive individual. Life is 
not merely a self-interested war of all against all. Labour markets 
are segmented, sometimes for good and sometimes for bad. 
Subtlety is brought to at least some work by more accessible 
forms of education. It’s not all alienation. Yet in terms of the ways 
in which we use money capital and property, we are all possessive 
individuals. Possessions do help to define us with or without 
rampant self interest. This makes some sense of Adam Smith’s 
aim to integrate studies of commerce and local social life in order 
to distil a basis for containing self-interest. Such analysis today, 
however, would require ingredients well beyond those Smith 
chose. 
 12 
These matters struck me forcefully in the course of research 
in central Australia where I pondered on the fact that indigenous 
Australians, whose service economy subordinates moveable 
property or ‘things’ to the reproduction of relatedness, are not 
possessive individuals – at least of kinds we are familiar with. 
Until quite recently, relatedness and land objectified the person, 
not so much moveable things. In traditional life, there were 
accumulations – of knowledge, ritual objects and women – and 
these accumulations brought status and power. But only the 
incautious would call them ‘property’ especially in the sense of 
private property. The jural rights attached to European 
ownership signal different institutions from those embedded in a 
foraging society and different emotional lives among kin. At least 
in part, the apparent dearth of moveable property, and British 
blindness to other things, brought the designation ‘savage.’ Re-
positioned and redefined, some elements of the sociality that 
sustained this society, and its no-growth economy, endure today 
to frustrate market economists in their prescriptions for 
Aboriginal people. The latter’s reluctance to ‘work’ and ‘save’ is 
treated as a pathology because, contra Smith, they did not emerge 
‘from the womb’ with this desire.xxx Their complicated 
circumstance today demonstrates that the ubiquity of private 
property suggested either by the natural law of property, or the 
decline of twentieth century socialism, is not unlimited.xxxi 
 
Conclusion 
I began with Macpherson and Smith and their competing 
accounts of the person in market society. The significant 
divergence in their views invites further analysis - especially in 
the light of recent comparable work on neoliberalism. A focus on 
the ‘person’ can be re-phrased as a concern with the ‘moral 
subject.’ The latter term simply draws attention to the 
orientations – the meanings and values manifest in practice – 
indicative of one or another individual. Understood in this way, 
persons are indices of structural possibilities and vice versa.   
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This problematic owes something both to the sociology of 
Durkheim on social constraint and Mauss on the person, and to 
historical materialism. It is fair to say that while Durkheim’s 
sociology lacks an economics, historical materialism, theoretically 
at least, precludes an account of moral subjects. xxxii Although 
Marx’s concepts of alienation, commodity fetishism and class 
domination entail issues of morality and justice, he was 
disinclined to pursue matters in these terms. He allowed himself 
only class, interest and consciousness, along with ideology. Not so 
his students. As David Richards has remarked, later Marxists 
who studied ‘actual revolutionary movements, such as E.P. 
Thompson and Barrington Moore Jr., have noted that arguments 
of injustice and even basic rights are crucial to the self-conception 
of revolutionary movements.’xxxiiiAdam Smith sought to integrate 
these factors but not successfully. Moreover, his failure was due 
not simply to the Scottish milieu in which he wrote or to the 
period in which he lived. Rather, his method was limited too. The 
commerce soon called ‘capitalism’ was never predominantly an 
equilibrium system in which the protection of property rights 
would bring relative equality. Nonetheless, Smith’s sociology of 
moral sentiment is tantalizing - so like Durkheim’s at many 
points but also different to the extent that it includes a treatment 
of commerce and competitive self-interest. The limits of these 
various methods suggest a terrain, theoretical as well as 
empirical, that anthropology should explore: the moral subjects of 
market society and their future possibilities, social and 
political.xxxiv This terrain would also include critique of the major 
structural constraints, many international, that prevent Smith’s 
‘sweet commerce’ from being a ‘commercial cosmopolis.’ xxxv  
It is quite understandable that Macpherson’s account of 
possessive individuals rings true in the midst of a period 
dominated by neoliberal ideology which argues that only the 
pursuit of private, not public, goods can bring a viable (though 
increasingly unequal) society. The designation of the state as ‘bad’ 
and market solutions as ‘good’ has induced numerous 
governments to reduce tax revenues derived from the wealthy 
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and also reduce public services and works. As Macpherson himself 
recognised though, these types of order, indicative of the later 
twentieth century and now the twenty-first, do not enjoy 
consensual support. This being so, it remains unclear how 
uniform the practices and the conceptual and value implicits of 
relevant subjects are. The fundamental weakness of both 
Dumont’s and Sahlins’ accounts, along with Macpherson’s idea of 
subjects as proprietors, is that all three versions involve unusually 
abstract accounts of the persons who reside in market society. 
Critiques of neoliberalism by anthropologists often resemble 
them. A real and specific phenomenon is obscured by vague 
critique whether in class or other terms. At this point, Adam 
Smith’s Humean-propelled empiricism has some appeal. 
In capitalism and market society, property of various types 
including private and personal property is as ubiquitous as 
neoliberalism is supposed to be and makes the notion of 
possessive individuals compelling.xxxvi Nonetheless, the roles and 
values given to property vary considerably according to contexts 
both social and material. Noting this ubiquity but also this 
variation raises a crucial question: In the absence of state 
socialism and the socialization of property, does possessive 
individualism lead inevitably to neoliberalism? My surmise is that 
the answer is ‘no’ but that answer needs evidential support. The 
current widespread rejection of socialist states with extensive 
public property, and an anthropology that seldom advocates for 
this alternative, should encourage practitioners to examine 
critically their positions on the forms of property central both to 
market society and liberal thought. The distribution of properties 
has changed since the time of Smith and Marx. Daniel Miller 
points to this albeit uncritically while Macpherson’s formulations 
tend to avoid it. A focus on the roles, rights and values claimed for 
the various properties according to context would hone our 
understanding of market society – both its dominations and 
potential solidarities. Taking the example of indigenous Australia, 
I have described just one situation in which property as it is often 
known has a circumscribed salience. Aboriginal people are not 
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first and foremost possessive individuals. Unfortunately, their 
practice brings only limited political power though it acts as a 
constant irritant to a state that cannot be rid of these recalcitrant 
people. We learn from this circumstance.  Finding such interstices 
among both the more and less powerful is a worthy agenda for a 
critical anthropology which needs both critiques of the state and 
accounts of local lives. There are no easy answers.  
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Footnotes 
                                                
i Sydney University 
ii  Central to David Hume’s ethics or moral philosophy was his view that 
human ethics can and should be grounded in human practice and 
independently of any reference to divine will or law. See Phillipson (2010) 
for an excellent account of Smith’s moral philosophy in a Scottish 
Enlightenment environment that also included Hume. 
iii My ideas on property in this context are quite differently focused from 
Alan Macfarlane’s (1978). 
iv The genealogy of neoliberalism is a quite specific one through Hayek, the 
Chicago School and public choice theory, cradled in the context of global 
corporations and financial market excess. See Hayek’s classic critical text 
on socialism (1944) and his clearest argument on prices (1948). For views 
of the Chicago School whom he influenced see Friedman (2002) and also 
the writings of Becker (1976) and Stigler (1975). For public choice theory, 
‘the extension of economic theory to the realm of political and 
governmental choices,’ refer to Buchanan (1968). On finance capitalism see 
Shiller (2003, 2012), Akerlof (1976) and their joint authored book in the 
wake of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), Akerlof and Shiller (2009). For 
portraits of the neo-liberal subject, see Ho (2009) and also Michael Lewis 
(1989, 2011). Curthoys (2010) presents an excellent discussion of neoliberal 
ideology and compares it with Marxist ideology. Also see David Harvey 
(2005) for more wide-ranging critique. 
v See Dumont (1977, 1992) and Sahlins (1976: vii-ix). Some views of mine 
on these matters may be found in Austin-Broos (1996 and 2009). 
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vi The link suggested here between political economy and phenomenology 
is intended. Traces of it are found in Marx’s writing on the nature of 
history including the transformative power of production as it bears on 
human need. See my remarks on Marx below.  
vii Neither in the case of Macpherson nor Smith have I substituted 
‘humankind’ for their now outmoded use of ‘man.’ My attempt produced a 
far less readable text. This critical note is my alternative response. 
viii  Macpherson (2011: 269-70, 1975:199). 
ix For particular references see Macpherson (2011: 220-221, 45-46, 59). 
x  See Tully (1993:19).  
xi On uses of the image of possessive individuals see Cunningham (2011: iv) 
and Dumont (1992:79-83). For examples of the Melanesian literature, see 
Sykes (2007), Patterson and Macintyre (2011) and Macintyre (2011).  For 
Macpherson’s final formulation, see the concluding chapter of his work 
(2011: espec 271-277). 
xii See Hirschman (1977, 1982) and also Fourcade and Healy (2007). 
xiii On ‘betterment’ and ‘improvement’ see Smith (1978: 487); on stages of 
society, accumulation and the relation between property and governance 
see Smith (1999 IV&V: 279ff, 441, 297-8 and 302).  
xiv See Buckle (1991: 150-151). 
xv See Phillipson (2010: 281). Phillipson suggests that the ‘experience of 
orthodox polemic at Glasgow, Oxford and Edinburgh’ left Smith, unlike 
Hume, with ‘a horror of violent religious controversy’ (ibid: 244). Possibly, 
Smith’s life with his mother in Kirkcaldy also made him less willing to 
embrace religious scepticism though he argued for a secular and socially-
based morality. 
xvi See Smith (1982: 9, 110, 224 (also cited in Forman-Barzilai 2010: 62), 
and 317).  
xvii On imagination, see Smith (1982:317). For a fascinating discussion of 
Smith on human imagination see Lloyd (2013) 
xviii At this particular point, Smith’s thinking resembles that of Emile 
Durkheim who proposed that sociality resides in constraint and thereby, he 
argued, in morality. 
xix For citations of Smith in this paragraph see (1982: 220, 144, 237) Also 
see Smith (1982: 227-237, 274-275). I am indebted to Forman-Bazilai (2011 
passim) for her argument regarding Smith, the Stoics and cosmopolitanism. 
Fleischaker’s interesting remarks on Smith and the ‘politics of poverty’ are 
found in (2004: 205-208). Also see Smith in The Wealth of Nations (1999 Bks 
I-III: 117-121).  
xx See Max Weber (1991: 270-272; 1968: 490-492). 
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xxi See Macpherson (2011:46-61). The difficulties in Macpherson’s view 
rehearsed by Tully (1993) are also identified by White and Vann (1983) in 
their discussion of Macfarlane’s work. The term, ‘stripped-down 
individualism comes from Sandel (1982). On market society, also see Sandel 
(2012). 
xxii The debate in Smith scholarship that revolves around the market 
individual has been won I think by the ‘liberal humanists for Smith’ rather 
than the neoliberals. Nonetheless, there are methodological issues in 
Smith’s work that prevent a truly integrated corpus. On Smith’s 
jurisprudence, see Haakonssen (1981).  
xxiii See Smith (1999 Bks I-III: 118-119, 117; 1978:538). 
xxiv Following the Thirty Years War, and in the midst of the Dutch’s 
Eighty Years War, Hugo Grotius sought to ground the rights of 
individuals in opposition to the state, including invading ones. 
xxv Grotius’ work is better known by its Latin title, De Jure Belli c Paci Libri 
Tres (1950 [1625]). For useful commentary on his work see Buckle 
(1991:1-52) and Haakonssen (1985). Locke’s famous statement is in The 
Second Treatise on Civil Government, (1948 [1690], Chapter V, para 17 (p. 
15)). This passage is cited at length in Fleischacker (2004:180) 
xxvi  See Tully (1993) for further discussion. Regarding non-domination of 
the citizen see Pettit (1997) on republicanism and freedom. 
xxvii Where Smith’s account rested on the division of labour, Marx 
emphasised productive property, theorized in terms of modes of production. 
See Marx and Engels (1970:42) 
xxviii In his classic text, Polanyi observes, ‘The outstanding discovery of 
recent historical and anthropological research is that man’s economy, as a 
rule, is submerged in his social relationships. … The economic system will 
be run on non-economic motives’ (1944: 46). This theme recurs across the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries from Max Weber’s emphasis upon the 
‘economically relevant’ as opposed to the ‘economic’ per se, to a recent 
account of the emotions that influence markets entitled Animal Spirits by 
Akerlof and Shiller (2009). 
xxix See Daniel Miller (1991), Georg Simmel (1978) and Thorsten Veblen 
(1973). On the ideology of the market in contemporary life see Sandel 
(2012). 
xxx See my discussions in Austin-Broos (2003 and 2006). It should be 
evident that my interpretation of possessive individualism in relation to 
indigenous culture diverges somewhat from the discussion in Melanesian 
ethnography. I do not take Macpherson’s account as simply given. 
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xxxi Grasping this historical circumstance is complicated by the fact that 
Aboriginal diffidence can also be related to the so-called welfare economy 
in which many Aboriginal people have lived now for generations. Cultural 
difference, disadvantage and demoralization all bear on the situation. 
xxxii See Lukes’ comment on Durkheim’s notion of moral rule, the individual 
and society (Lukes 1973: 22-23). Although it is a particular and critical 
view, Lukes on Durkheim can be profitably read in conjunction with his 
Marxism and Morality (1985).  
xxxiii See Richards (1985:1191). 
xxxiv These matters bear on any possible rapprochement between ideas of 
socialist and liberal equality. On this matter, compare Buchanan (1982) and 
Nielson (1985). Richards’ (1985) discussion of these texts is illuminating. 
Also see Mouffe (1993) who links the issue of socialism’s future to the 
writings of C.B. Macpherson. 
xxxv For Smith’s ideas on the blessings of commerce see Forman-Barzilai 
(2010:196-217). Two good discussions of current constraints can be found 
in Stiglitz (2013:332-363) and Picketty (2014:471-570). 
xxxvi My discussion overall should not be taken to eschew public property. 
Rather, my view is that the current widespread rejection of socialist states 
with extensive public property, and an anthropology that seldom advocates 
for this alternative, should encourage practitioners to examine critically 
their positions on these other forms of property central both to market 
society and liberal thought. 
